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Richard O. Mayne

H

ollywood itself could hardly have scripted
a better battle. According to eyewitnesses,
a German U-boat lurking off the shores of
North Point, Prince Edward Island, laid a trap
for an unsuspecting convoy transitting the
Northumberland Strait. On 7 May 1943, the
trap was sprung. Canadian naval escorts and
aircraft did their best to defend the beleaguered
convoy from a brazen and unorthodox attack
that was unlike any other. There could be only
one conclusion: the German commander was
half-mad. Just like the fictional Captain Ahab,
he was willing to take unwarranted risks with
his boat and men to destroy his white whale that
came in the form of a troop ship at the centre of
the convoy. His obsession led to a stunning three
hour engagement that was brought to a dramatic
end as the Canadians scored a direct hit forcing
the U-boat’s bow to rise sharply out of the water
before sinking.1 The problem is that there is no
evidence that this battle ever took place.
Islanders have retold this story – or versions
of it – for over 60 years and it likely would have
remained nothing more than a local legend
except for one thing: in 1989 a New Brunswick
diver found a submarine wreck in the precise
spot where the witnesses claimed the battle took
place. Despite directions in two separate diving
guides, no one has managed to relocate this
wreck which is said to lie 1.25 miles from shore
in approximately 95 feet of water. The inability
positively to identify what some call the “anomaly”
has only fuelled interest. So much so, that major
Canadian broadcasting networks have aired
stories on the legend, while a prominent naval
historian, Marc Milner, used the myth as the
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basis for a novel entitled Incident at North Point.
Scores of divers, naval scholars and enthusiasts
have sought a resolution to a mystery that Mary
Mackay, a Charlottetown journalist, argues is
“as controversial as the Shroud of Turin and the
monster at Loch Ness.”2 After years of research
the shroud over this legend can finally be lifted.
And the answer not only explains what people
saw on that May day in 1943, but it also reveals
important insights about larger historical issues
involving the power of folklore and its impact on
local history.
If, as historian Marc Milner has asked, the
object found off PEI was indeed a U-boat, why
had the Canadian government not trumpeted
its destruction back in 1943? It was a good
question. Even more intriguing was the fact that
neither Canadian nor German naval records
contained any hint of a battle having been fought
in this location. When confronted with a lack of
documentation some have turned to conspiracy
theories. One such hypothesis holds that Prime
Minister Mackenzie King’s cabinet covered up
the sinking of a Vichy French submarine because
of sensitivities in Quebec towards the pro-Nazi
government in France. Yet another contends
that the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was guilty
of hiding some type of horrific friendly-fire
accident.3
Under normal circumstances such
conspiracies are difficult to refute because they
are built on the premise that the lack of evidence
proves the theory. But the diver’s description of
the object as “covered with debris, lots of nets…
220 by 25 feet with a large deck gun, a 20 mm
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Unlike the mythical North Point battle, which described an unrealistic and suicidal in-shore surface attack by a U-boat, this
photo captures the real-life results of a 30-hour “hunt to exhaustion.” As with most commanders, the captain of the U-744
did everything in his power to remain submerged and only surfaced when his battery power and oxygen ran short.

anti-aircraft gun, [and] periscopes” casts serious
doubt on the possibility that it was an Allied
submarine. French and Italian ones can also
be ruled out. What is more compelling is that
these dimensions are consistent with those of a
Type VIIC U-boat.4 The theory that the object is
a Type VIIC is particularly popular with U-boat
enthusiasts. It also has its detractors.5 Critics
are quick to point out that none of the U-boats
lost during the war were anywhere near PEI at
the time of their loss.6 That being said the U-376
is particularly important to this investigation
because it was actually ordered to North Point
to rescue escaped German naval officers during
the first week of May 1943.
Operation Elster (Magpie in English) was an
intricate and elaborate plan. German prisoners
at Camp 70 near Fredericton, New Brunswick,
were to stage a breakout and make their way to
North Point. 7 This seemingly impossible gauntlet
was never attempted. The escape fell through.
As for the U-376, it was reported as destroyed
in the Bay of Biscay off France by a British
Wellington bomber from 172 Squadron. This

appeared to eliminate the U-376 as a contender
for the mysterious object off PEI. This changed
when research in the 1990s conclusively proved
that the original assessment was wrong. The
Wellington had actually inflicted serious damage
on another U-boat rather than U-376.8 And so,
given that U-376 was not sunk where previously
presumed; that it was heading for North Point,
PEI; and that numerous witnesses claim they saw
a battle in the exact location where a modernday diver says the wreck of a U-boat lies, it is
understandable why some people are convinced
that the anomaly is a German submarine. At the
very least it gives the myth resilience against its
critics. Skeptics would nevertheless reiterate
that there is absolutely no evidence of any naval
battle having been fought in this location. They
are right to say so.
Canadian officials were aware that some
type of special operation involving POWs and a
U-boat was in the works. Coded letters between
the prisoners at Camp 70 and their homes in
Germany were used as a means to plan the details
of Operation Elster.9 What the Germans did
5
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Two days after the U-376 was declared
missing, U-boat Headquarters ordered the
mission’s backup boat, U-262, to Canada.
Arriving off North Point at 0631 hours on 2 May,
the U-262 took up station to the east of the Island
waiting for some type of signal from the escapees.
After four days without any sign of the POWs the
U-boat’s commander finally gave up and returned
to his base in France empty handed. Despite the
fact that a U-boat was in the area, the U-262’s
presence off the eastern shores of North Point
does not explain what people witnessed on 7 May
1943. Both the accounts of the battle as well as
the reported location of the wreck were to the
west of North Point whereas the log of the U-262
makes clear that it never once strayed into these
waters. It also left a full day early.11
It is within the details of the mysterious
battle where the key to the riddle lies. Cracking
the myth rests with two specific testimonials
which positively identify the attacking surface
units as corvettes.12 Based on a distinctive whale
catcher design, the Flower Class corvette was
mass-produced for both the RCN and Royal
Navy (RN) and was therefore one of the most
recognizable anti-submarine platforms on the
North Atlantic.13 This promising lead quickly hit
a dead end. A study of all RCN and RN corvettes
left little doubt that none were near PEI on the
day of the battle. Once again, some enthusiasts
turned to conspiracy theories involving doctored
ship’s logs to explain this discrepancy, while
yet another idea was that the eyewitnesses had
simply mistaken the attacker’s identity. Fairmiles
and minesweepers were other types of escorts
that frequented the Gulf of St. Lawrence area, and
confusing them for a corvette was a reasonable
possibility. Of course, the RCN and RN were not
the only navies to operate corvettes.

The true story of what happened at North
Point actually began in Quebec. It was in that
province where three corvettes being built for the
RN were transferred to the United States Coast
Guard. Renamed USS Alacrity, USS Haste and
USS Intensity, these corvettes made their way
down the St. Lawrence River en route to Boston.
This offered local authorities with an opportunity.
The merchant ship Essex Lance, required an
escort to take it from Quebec City through the
Northumberland Strait and the Gulf of Canso
to Halifax. As a matter of convenience it would
get three corvettes; and such a disproportionate
escort presence for a lone merchantman gave an
impression of importance that the Essex Lance’s
cargo of grain and flour did not warrant.14 When
the Essex Lance and its escorts neared the
North coast of PEI on the morning of 7 May,
local observers began an interpretive process
that turned the real cargo of flour and grain into
a mythical one of troops. And with that a legend
started to take shape.

Naval Historical Center Photo # NH 97406

not know was that this code had been cracked.
“Intercepted letter to Prisoner of War in Canada,”
read one British intelligence report, “indicates
intention [that] the U/Boat shall wait…for several
days during new moon period in May.” With the
new moon occurring on 4 May, the RCN had a
good idea of when the rendezvous was going to
take place; instead it was their assumption that
the prisoners would be heading south for the
Gulf of Maine that was wrong.10 It was a fateful
mistake.

DHH 81/520/1000 Box 142 File 3
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Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of
the eyewitness accounts was that they got so
much right. The logbooks from these American
warships confirm a good portion of the legend.
For instance, according to one observer the battle
began around 0900 hours. Another, who was ten
years old at the time, “vividly recalls that fateful
day” when he heard explosions while playing at
Skinner’s Pond which “rattled cupboards” and
shocked the local populace “from their sleepy
morning routine.” The Alacrity’s log states that
the convoy was indeed approaching North Point
and that this ship went to general quarters – an
American naval term for a heightened state of
combat readiness – for 15 minutes starting at
0815 hours. It is also interesting that no one
claimed to have seen the morning portion of
the battle. Reports suggest that the sound of
detonations were heard and felt, but that there
was a general sense of confusion as “every time
there was an explosion, people were running up
to the woods and hiding. They didn’t know what
was going on.” The reason no one knew what was
happening was provided by an air force weather
report from Summerside. Thick fog blanketed
the waters off PEI at 0900 hours and visibility
was “near zero.”15
By mid-morning the fog began to lift, and as
a result the testimonials from observers include

6
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Although the United States Coast Guard identiﬁed their corvettes as patrol boats, these photographs of HMCS
Beauharnois (top) and USS Intensity (bottom) show how shore observers could easily mistake an American for a
Canadian ship.

visual details such as one account that recorded
how the convoy approached the Island from the
East.16 At first glance this does not make sense:
after rounding the Gaspé Peninsula ships heading
for the Northumberland Strait came from the
North. Another, more detailed report told a
similar tale. Jim Morrissey had a great view of
the developing battle from the top of the North
Point lighthouse: “…the big ship was coming in…
She’d have the troops on her…there were quite a
few smaller boats…the submarine was following.

The large ship was moving to shallower waters so
the submarine couldn’t go underneath her.”17 The
Essex Lance was indeed heading into shallower
water but not for the reason Morrissey gave.
Thanks to the poor visibility as well as flooding
tides and heavy currents, the convoy had been
pushed well out to sea during its transit through
the Gulf. When the escorts’ radars finally made
landfall it was quickly determined that the convoy
had overshot the mouth of the Northumberland
Strait. Correcting this error gave the appearance
7
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A reconstruction of the log from
USS Alacrity shows how the convoy
had to round North Point because
tidal and weather conditions
caused it to miss the mouth of the
Northumberland Strait. The log
also shows that the Alacrity went to
action stations at 1310 exactly when
and where eyewitnesses said a
battle took place.

8
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This photograph, which captured two corvettes involved in anti-submarine warfare exercises off Halifax in December
1941, shows how easy it would be to mistake surface forces involved in a practice attack with the real thing.

of an eastern approach. Rather than being a
source of protection, the shoals represented a
grounding hazard that had to be avoided through
further course alterations.18 The comparison
between what actually happened on the ships
and the perceptions of those ashore makes an
important point: the facts as reported by the
eyewitnesses were often correct even if their
interpretation was not.
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The same was true for the so-called battle.
Hours had passed since the first explosion had
been heard and further detonations – along
with the arrival of an RCAF aircraft – helped to
build a growing sense of excitement among the
spectators on shore. The climax soon followed
with an “unsuccessful attempt by [the] U-boat to
sink [the] cargo ship at about 1:00 pm.”19 But
while the Alacrity did go to general quarters at
1310 hours for a short three-minute period in
the exact spot where the witnesses said the battle
took place, none of the American logbooks even
hint at the presence of a U-boat. Signals from the
corvettes to Halifax were equally devoid of any
reference to sighting the enemy, explaining why an
action report – a mandatory procedure anytime
American warships were involved in combat
– was not filed by these ships for the month of

May.20 Only one conclusion can be drawn from
such overwhelming evidence – there was no
battle.
Rather, an eagerness to test the mettle of the
crews and the fighting strength of their newly
commissioned ships led the commanding officers
of the Haste, Intensity and Alacrity to conduct a
series of weapons’ drills and live firing exercises
during the passage to Halifax. What the islanders
had likely first heard, and then later saw, was
a series of three exercises conducted at 0815
hours and 1130 hours followed by the one that
was interpreted as the battle’s climax at 1310
hours. While it appears that it was the Intensity
and Haste that were actually doing the shooting,
their logs offer only sketchy details. Fortunately
the Alacrity’s log was extremely well maintained,
and thanks to their efforts it is possible to get a
sense of what the eyewitness probably saw.21
Although it occurred two days earlier, the
details of the Alacrity’s weapons’ test provide
a good sense of what Haste and Intensity did
off the coast of PEI: “Stopped. Lying to making
preparations to hold test firing of 4” gun, 4
rounds expended. No casualties. Held test firing
of hedgehog [an ahead-firing anti-submarine
9

Mayne - North Point.indd 9

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol16/iss3/2

08/08/2007 5:20:26 PM

6

Mayne: North Point: Myth or Reality?

The documentary evidence strongly
suggests that the myth was based on a series
of misinterpretations and coincidences, but the
question surrounding the modern day discovery
of the wreck off PEI remains. Upon closer
scrutiny the spark that triggered so much interest
in the legend loses much of its luster. During an
interview with a journalist, the diver who located
the wreck started to express doubts about his
find, observing that he “cannot say for certain that
what he saw was a German U-boat.” The object
he saw was covered in sand, and attempts to take
photographs during two subsequent dives did not
succeed because of poor lighting and turbulent
waters.24 An attempt by the Canadian navy to
find the wreck in the mid-1990s further casts
doubts on the original claim. Using its side scan

DHH 81/520/1000 Box 141 File 23

The aircraft that at least one witness claimed
dealt the final deathblow to the U-boat can also
be explained. Despite the poor visibility that
day, a 119 Squadron Lockheed Hudson from
Chatham, New Brunswick, managed to take off
at 1230 hours. Half an hour later it was circling
over North Point – just as the witnesses reported.
Its mission was to carry out routine “creeping

line” searches ahead of the convoy, which it did
without incident.23 Dipping in and out of a thick
ceiling of cloud cover, this aircraft did not even
spot the convoy let alone a U-boat.

DHH R A/C L Lockheed Hudson

projectile]. 26 charges expended, No casualities.
Held test firing of depth charges 2 charges
expended. No casualties. Test completed.” 22
The depth charges and hedgehog would have
been particularly impressive. The shallow water
around North Point ensured that the contactfused hedgehogs exploded while the depth
charges would have produced towering water
geysers filled with dark silt. Those on shore
would have had no idea that it was just a drill,
and as a result the combination of gunfire and
underwater pyrotechnics produced a spectacular
show that was easily confused for a battle.

Shallow depth charge attacks like
those produced in the 100 feet of
water around North Point, PEI would
have resulted in large and silt-ﬁlled
explosions. This dramatic effect
would only add to the confusion of
observers on shore.
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According to eyewitnesses, the “death blow” struck to the North Point U-boat was delivered by an aircraft. Air force
records show that the only aircraft in the area was a 119 Squadron Lockheed Hudson (like the one pictured here) which
did carry out a “creeping line” search in the area but without incident.

sonar, the minesweeper HMCS Morseby searched
the area without result, while on the same day
another diver found “two large boulders the size
of a severed submarine.”25 This suggests that the
original sighting was the product of local stories
having so influenced a professional diver that
he interpreted menacing boulders in the murky
waters around PEI as a U-boat.
There is also the question of what became
of the U-376. Although improbable, there is
circumstantial evidence that this U-boat continued
on with its mission, and was operating in the Gulf
of St. Lawrence in May. Having spotted what they
believed was a slowly submerging U-boat some
55 miles east of PEI on 16 May, the crew of an
Avro Anson aircraft from Charlottetown dropped
two depth charges and claimed that they had
narrowly missed the periscope. Thirty minutes
later an oil slick developed in the spot where the
attack took place, a fact that was confirmed by
another aircraft. This was not enough to convince
the U-boat assessment committee – the Allied
authority responsible for awarding such victories
– which concluded that there was “insufficient
evidence of the presence of a U-boat.” 26 A
second attack, reported five days later, was
also inconclusive. Located some 65 miles to the
north of the first, this encounter began when
a Consolidated Catalina from 117 Squadron
dropped a cluster of depth charges on what the
crew felt was a periscope trailing convoy SQ 48.

However, the captain of the corvette, HMCS Ville
de Quebec, had his doubts, telling his superiors
that the “contact could have been anything.” The
assessment committee agreed, observing that
there was “insufficient evidence of damage.”27
As a result, the likelihood of finding the U-376
in these particular locations is remote, but they
do represent a more realistic option than North
Point.
Skeptics have consistently argued that the
North Point legend was the result of an innocent
event being contorted beyond recognition. In
the end they were right. But it would appear
that the eyewitnesses had not twisted reality
as badly as suspected, and that is perhaps the
most fascinating aspect of the North Point legend.
Most of what they saw actually happened. It
was only their interpretation of those events
that was misleading. Individuals have a natural
tendency to fill gaps in their understanding of
dramatic events with conjecture. And it was this
type of speculative guesswork that allowed the
myth to grow to the point where it developed a
life of its own. The legend becomes part of the
community’s common history and nothing short
of dragging the waters around PEI will discourage
true believers. So while the American logbooks
leave no doubt that the shots off North Point
were not fired in anger, the power of the legend
nevertheless forces the overly cautious scholar to
leave wiggle room for the remote possibility that
11
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a German submarine rests somewhere off the
coast of North Point, PEI. The American records
nevertheless make one thing clear: if there is
a U-boat wreck there it was the product of the
most improbable fluke shot of the Second World
War.

Notes
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.

15.

Henry Keatts and George Farr, Dive into History, Volume
3: U-Boats (Houston, Pisces Books, 1994), pp.201-3.
David N. Barron, The Combined Atlantic Diver Guide,
(North Maritime Research, Halifax, 1999), p.323; Keatts,
Dive into History, 201-203; Mary MacKay, “Marine
mystery,” Weekend Guardian-Patriot, 13 May 1995;
Julie Watson, Shipwrecks and Seafaring Tales of
Prince Edward Island (Toronto, Hounslow Press, 1994),
p.145.
Marc Milner, Incident at North Point (St. Catharines,
Vanwell, 1998), pp.231-234; Mary MacKay, “Marine
mystery,” Weekend Guardian-Patriot, 13 May 1995.
Others have suggested that the Islanders had witnessed
some type of fleet exercise or even the filming of the movie
49th Parallel which portrayed an attack on a U-boat in
Canadian waters.
Keatts, Dive into History, pp.201-203. The Type VIIC
was 218 feet, 1 inches long and 20 feet, 5 inches wide.
For a sample of the strength of the “U-boat theory,” see
the forum on <www.u-boat.net>.
See “Translations of BdU War Log,” 1-31 May 1943,
Directorate of History and Heritage [DHH] 79/456,
Vol.7.
Michael Hadley, U-boats against Canada (McGillQueen’s Press, Kingston, 1985), pp.170-174.
Axel Niestle, German U-boat losses during World War
II (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1998), pp.59, 227.
Mary MacKay, “The Tale of Two Subs,” The Guardian
as reprinted on <www.powell-pressburger.org>.
Admiralty message, 29 April 1943, DHH 97/3, Series 3,
SRH.
BdU War Log, 6 May 1943, DHH 79/456, vol. 7 and U
262 Log, 6 May 1943, DHH 83/665, Box 47.
Marc Milner, Incident at North Point, 231-234; Mary
MacKay, “Marine mystery,” Weekend Guardian-Patriot,
13 May 1995.
For more information on the corvettes see: Ken
Macpherson and Marc Milner, Corvettes of the Royal
Canadian Navy, 1939-1945 (St. Catharines, Vanwell,
1993).
NCSO to CinC CNA, 05 0436 May 1943, DHH
81/520/8280, Box 264; Ship movement cards, USS
Alacrity, DHH; Ship movement cards, USS Intensity,
DHH.
Mary MacKay, “Marine mystery,” Weekend GuardianPatriot, 13 May 1995; USS Alacrity Ship’s log, National
Archives and Records Administration [NARA]; RCAF
Operational diary, DHH Reel 219, 1GR School,

16.
17.
18.

19.
20.

21.

22.
23.

24.
25.
26.

27.

(Summerside, PEI). The author would like to thank
Mr. Patrick Osborn from the NARA for his extensive
assistance with my research.
Barron, The Combined Atlantic Diver Guide, p.323.
Mary MacKay, “Marine mystery,” Weekend GuardianPatriot, 13 May 1995.
NCSO to CinC CNA , 050436 May 1943, DHH
81/520/8280, Box 264; Roger Jordan, The World’s
Merchant Fleets, (London, Chatham Publishing, 1999),
p.161.
Henry Keatts, Dive into History, pp.201-203; Mary
MacKay, “Marine mystery,” Weekend Guardian-Patriot,
13 May 1995.
Movements – USS Haste, Library and Archives
Canada [LAC] RG 24, Reel C-5892, NSS 8700-736/60;
Movements – USS Alacrity RG 24, Reel C-5892, NSS
8700-736/408. According to these messages the only
significant incident during this trip to Halifax was a
report from Alacrity asking if it could proceed directly
to Boston because of a leaky condenser. Patrick Osborn
NARA to author, 7 December 2005. A search of the “After
Action Reports” held at the Naval Historical Center
in Washington, DC, revealed that there were none for
Alacrity, three for Haste (one from July 1944 and two
from February 1945), and only two for Intensity (both
dating from early 1944).
Patrick Osborn (NARA) to author, 7 December 2005,
USS Intensity and USS Haste Log, 7 May 1943, NARA.
Haste’s log simply noted that they were “underway” while
Intensity’s had a line marked across the page.
USS Alacrity Log, 5 May 1943, NARA.
Orders issued by Gulf Group Controller, May 1943,
DHH 181.005 (D 1556); RCAF Operational diary, DHH
Reel 219; 1GR School, (Summerside, PEI), and 119 Sqn
Chatham Det., Reel 101.
Mary MacKay, “Marine mystery,” Weekend GuardianPatriot, 13 May 1995; Henry Keatts, Dive into History,
pp.201-203.
Mary MacKay, “The Tale of Two Subs,” The Guardian
as reprinted on <www.powell-pressburger.org>.
Orders issued by Gulf Group Controller, 1943, DHH
181.005 (D 1556); Eastern Air Command Monthly Antisubmarine reports, May 1943, DHH, 321.009 (D6); EAC
Operational Intelligence Summary No. 53, DHH, 321.009
(D84); Halifax Monthly Report of Proceeds (Hereafter
ROPs) May 1943, DHH, 81/520-1000-5-13, vol. 18;
RCAF a/c attack on U-Boats, Attack by Anson W 165 of
31 GRS RCAF 16 May 1943, DHH, 181.003 (D1345).
HMCS Ville de Quebec ship’s log, 21 May 1943, LAC RG
24, Vol.7588; Ville de Quebec to NSHQ, 211858 May
1943, LAC Vol. 6903, file NSS 8910-331/119; HMCS
Ville de Quebec, ROP for Convoy SQ 48, 24 May 1943,
DHH 81/520/8280-SQ 48; RCAF Aircraft Attacks on Uboats re Attack by Catalina S of 117 Sqn 21 May 1943,
DHH 181.003 (D1346).

Richard Mayne is an historian with the
Directorate of History and Heritage in Ottawa
and a PhD candidate at Queen’s University.

12

Mayne - North Point.indd 12

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2007

08/08/2007 5:20:28 PM

9

